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The Effect of Role Origin on Bidding Behavior  
in an Asymmetric All-Pay Auction:  
An Experiment†
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Abstract:  This paper reports the results of an experiment concerning whether different origins 
of bidder role affect bidding behavior in the two-person all-pay auction in which ties are broken 
in favor of one role (strong bidder) over the other (weak bidder). Two role allocation procedures 
are compared. In the first one, the roles are allocated at random. In the second one, the roles are 
allocated based on their performance in a simple real-effort task. The data provided no evidence to 
confirm the effect of role origin on bidding behavior in the current asymmetric all-pay auction.
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JEL Classification: C9, C
1. Introduction
In experimental economics randomization is a commonly used technique in order to ensure 
each subject an equal chance of being assigned to each of different roles, such as advantageous 
and disadvantageous roles. However, there are two potential issues about this common practice. 
First, randomization may undermine external validity. A casual observation suggests that the right 
to become an advantageous role is not always obtained by luck but often by prior efforts or skills. 
Second, and more importantly, how people behave may be sensitive to how they obtain roles. 
For example, Hoffman et al. (99) detected the possibility that role origin matters in economic 
decision-making situations. They conducted the ultimatum game experiment in which the right to 
become the proposer role was allocated either by luck or by the score on a general knowledge quiz. 
 For example, consider the election contest in which two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, are 
running for office. Even if they are expected to divide the vote evenly, the incumbent would end up with 
an election victory due to officeholder benefits, such as greater name recognition and voters’ status-quo 
bias. To establish the right to enjoy officeholder benefits, the incumbent usually has to exert substantial 
prior efforts; he has to accumulate more experience in office, engage in fundraising events, and make his 
presence felt among his constituents.
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They found that the latter case induced the proposers to significantly lower their proposals.
The proposer is known to be in the stronger position as previous experimental research on 
ultimatum games shows that the proposer tends to earn 50% to 0% of the pie. The finding of 
Hoffman et al. (99) hints that the earned right to be in an advantageous position may serve to 
legitimize the right to exploit its advantages even more. Then, a natural question is whether this 
finding can be replicated in other economic decision-making situations where role differences are 
clearly defined, such as asymmetric competitions. 
This paper reports on an experiment designed to explore the effect of role origin on bidding 
behavior in the two-person all-pay auction in which one role (strong bidder) is more advantageous 
than the other (weak bidder). Role origin refers to the procedure that allocates the two bidder 
roles to subjects. The experiment consists of two treatments. In one treatment, subjects compete 
in a simple real-effort task in order to secure the advantageous role in the auction. In the other 
treatment, the two roles are allocated randomly. 
The current experiment is designed in that in theory bidders’ bidding strategies remain 
the same between the treatments; subjects should bid according to the same mixed strategy. 
However, the effect of role origin, if such exists, may induce subjects to bid differently in the 
earned treatment. For example, a subject earning the strong bidder role by effort forms a feeling of 
entitlement to the prize and a subject in the weak bidder role respects the opponent’s exerted effort. 
Then, both bidder roles may bid non-competitively.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section  presents a model of the two-person asymmetric all-pay 
auction and its unique equilibrium solution. Section  describes an experiment to examine the effect 
of role origin on bidding behavior in the all-pay auction. Section  summarizes the results. Section 5 
concludes.
2. Model
Risk-neutral strong and weak bidders, indexed by s and w, compete over a single, indivisible 
prize v. Its valuation is the same for both bidders. Each bidder independently chooses a bid bi, 
i ∈ {s, w}, from the common discrete strategy space B = {0, ε,  ε, ... , c}, where ε > 0 and c is the 
common bid cap. v and c are assumed to be multiples of ε such that v > c > ε. 
Ties are broken asymmetrically; the strong bidder wins the prize if bs ≧ bw, and the weak bidder 
 It is well known in the theoretical literature of contests that when asymmetry between contestants 
is sufficiently large, they expend their resources non-competitively. This phenomenon is called the 
discouragement ef fect (Konrad, 009). In the current setting, however, theory suggests that this 
phenomenon does not occur.
 Otsubo (05) characterized a complete set of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for the model with 
no binding bidding cap. In a sharp contrast to the current model, there exist both a unique symmetric 
equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria.
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wins it otherwise. Thus, the weak bidder has to outbid the strong bidder. Their payoff functions are 
given as follows:
π









where πi( ⋅ ) is bidder i’s payoff function. For any pure-strategy profile at least one bidder has an 
incentive to unilaterally deviate her strategy, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
In the mixed extension of the game, denote by (σs, σw) a profile of mixed strategies, where σi is 
bidder i’s mixed strategy, i.e., a probability distribution over B, and σi(b) is the probability assigned 
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with equilibrium payoffs v – c for the strong bidder and 0 for the weak bidder. In equilibrium, the 
expected bids are c−
c(c+ϵ )
2v
 for the strong bidder and c (c+ϵ )
2v
 for the weak bidder, respectively. 
Thus, the expected sum of the bids is always equal to c. The probability that the strong bidder wins 
the prize is 1−c
(c+ϵ )
2v2
, which is larger than 0.5. Due to the unfair tie-breaking rule, the strong bidder 
always has a higher chance of winning the prize than the weak bidder.
3. Experiment
3.1 Design
There were two treatments in the experiment. In the random treatment, strong and weak 
bidder roles were randomly allocated in that half of the subjects played the strong bidder role and 
the remaining subjects played the weak bidder role. In the earned treatment, on the other hand, 
the two roles were allocated according to their performance in a simple real-effort task similar to 
the counting zeros task introduced by Abeler et al. (0). There were 0 questions in this task, 
 The proof is available upon request.
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each of which consists of about 00 integers ranging from 0 to 9. Subjects were given six minutes to 
count zeros in these questions. They were ranked based on the number of questions they answered 
correctly and then divided into two equal-size groups, the high score group and the low score 
group. Subjects in the former group played the strong bidder role, whereas those in the latter group 
played the weak bidder role.
The same set of parameter values was adopted in both treatments; c = 800, v = 000, and ε = 
00.5  In equilibrium both bidders use the same mixed strategy that assigns probability 0. to each 
of the bids 0, 00, 00, 00, and 800. The probability that the strong bidder wins the prize is 0.. 
Their expected bids are equal to 00.
One may notice that both bidders can assure their equilibrium payoffs by choosing their 
maximin strategies, namely 800 for the strong bidder and 0 for the weak bidder. The current all-pay 
action belongs to a class of unprofitable games (Harsanyi, 9); games in which maximin strategies 
do not coincide with the unique equilibrium strategies, yet yield the same payoff as the equilibrium 
strategies. Several game theorists conjectured that the unprofitability of the equilibrium undermines 
its plausibility as a predictor (for example, Harsanyi, 9; Aumann and Maschler, 9).
The extent to which a subject is willing to undertake such a risky mixed strategy depends on 
the subject’s risk attitude. Suppose that the strong bidder chooses his maximin strategy, he will 
earn a sure payoff of 00. If his bid falls to, say 00, his potential payoff rises to 00, but whether or 
not he will receive this payoff relies on what the weak bidder does. In the presence of such strategic 
uncertainty, he would form a belief that the probability of getting this payoff is less than one. A risk-
loving strong bidder would still be willing to choose a lower bid, whereas a risk-averse strong bidder 
would bid 800 for a sure payoff of 00. By the similar argument, a risk-loving weak bidder would be 
willing to bid higher, whereas a risk-averse weak bidder would bid 0. It is of particular importance 
to measure subjects’ risk attitudes in order to interpret the all-pay auction data. Therefore, prior to 
playing the all-pay auction, subjects were given a simple lottery choice task inspired by Holt and 
Laury (00) for elicitation of subjects’ risk preferences.
3.2 Procedures
A total of seventy-six undergraduate students from various majors enrolled at Soka University in 
Tokyo, Japan, were recruited from an online bulletin board on the university’s portal site. Thirty-
six of them participated in the random treatment and the rest the earned treatment. The numbers 
of males and females participated in the experiment were 5 and , respectively. These treatments 
5 The currency unit of these values is Japanese Yen. When the experiment was conducted, the USD/JPY 
currency exchange rate ranged approximately from 08 yen to 09 yen.
 A tie occurs with probability 0..
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had four sessions each, and no subject was allowed to take part in more than one session. Each 
session lasted about 90 minutes, including instructions and payment. 
Once all subjects were seated, they began to read instructions for Stage  silently at their own 
pace.8  Then, an experimenter read the instructions aloud to induce their common knowledge. The 
experimenter answered questions individually.
In Stage , subjects were presented with a list of ten choice problems between a gamble 
with payoffs of 00 yen or 0 yen (called as “Option A”) and a certain payoff of 0 yen (called as 
“Option B”). Table  displays the ten paired lottery choice problems used in Stage . Subjects 
were instructed to state which option, A or B, they would prefer for each problem. The instructions 
clearly explained that the earnings of Stage  would be determined by playing one of the lottery 
choice problems drawn randomly at the end of the session. Notice that as moving down the table, 
the probability of the high payoff ph in Option A decreases. Though everyone is expected to choose 
Option A in the st choice problem, when ph becomes sufficiently low, subjects are expected to 
switch over to Option B. For example, a risk-neutral subject should cross over to Option B in the 
th choice problem whereas a risk-averse subject should switch to Option B before the th choice 
problem. At the end of Stage , subjects were asked to answer individual characteristics that may 
have an impact on risk preferences, such as gender (Croson and Gneezy, 009), academic major, 
and the number of years attended at Soka University.
After completion of Stage , subjects were given new instructions for Stage  and asked to read 
the instructions silently at their own pace. Just as in Stage  the experimenter read the instructions 
aloud and answered questions individually. This stage began with assigning the two roles, the 
strong bidder (called as “Player A”) and the weak bidder (called as “Player B”), to subjects through 
 Each session accommodated either 8 or 0 subjects.
8 Instructions are available upon request.
Problem No. Option A Option B
 00 yen with probability , 0 yen with probability 0 0 yen
 00 yen with probability 0.9, 0 yen with probability 0. 0 yen
 00 yen with probability 0.8, 0 yen with probability 0. 0 yen
 00 yen with probability 0., 0 yen with probability 0. 0 yen
5 00 yen with probability 0., 0 yen with probability 0. 0 yen
 00 yen with probability 0.5, 0 yen with probability 0.5 0 yen
 00 yen with probability 0., 0 yen with probability 0. 0 yen
8 00 yen with probability 0., 0 yen with probability 0. 0 yen
9 00 yen with probability 0., 0 yen with probability 0.8 0 yen
0 00 yen with probability 0., 0 yen with probability 0.9 0 yen
Table : The ten paired lottery choice problems in Stage 
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one of two role assignment procedures described above. After role assignment, each subject was 
randomly paired with a subject of the opposite role. Subjects had no way of knowing the identity of 
their opponents. Before playing the auction game, subjects completed the quiz to make sure their 
understanding of the instructions.
Subjects played the auction game only once. Each subject received an endowment of 000 yen 
and independently and simultaneously chose her bid, which had to be a multiple of 00 yen between 
0 yen and 800 yen inclusive. After all subjects submitted their bids, the experimenter collected them 
and then privately informed each subject of whether or not she won and how much she earned in 
this stage.
At the end of the session, the experimenter determined the earnings for Stage  by using a 
bingo cage in front of subjects. The bingo cage contained 0 balls numbered from  to 0. The 
experimenter turned the bingo cage twice with replacement. The first draw determined which 
paired lottery choice problem to be selected for payment, and the second draw determined the 
outcome of Option A in the selected choice problem.9 Then, the experimenter calculated the total 
earnings subjects had accumulated and paid them privately in cash. The average individual earnings 
were 5 yen, including a show-up fee of 00 yen.0
3.3 Hypothesis
Differences in role origins do not alter the unique equilibrium, which serves to establish the 
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis. Holding the player role constant, there is no difference in the bid distribution between the 
two role origins.
4. Results
4.1 Lottery Choice Task (Stage 1)
This section begins with reporting results of the lottery choice task in Stage . It is worthwhile 
noting that three subjects who switched back and forth between the two options, as they moved 
down the problems in Table . Although these subjects stayed in the session until the end, their 
data were removed from the following analyses since their behavior is considered inconsistent. 
Therefore, the updated dataset includes only seventy-three subjects.
The proportions of Option A choices made by all subjects are shown by the solid line with 
9 Suppose that the first draw is seven and the second draw is four. This means that the seventh paired 
lottery choice problem will be selected for payment. Those who chose Option A will earn 00 yen and 
those who chose Option B will automatically earn 0 yen.
0 The regional minimum hourly wage was 958 yen at the time of the experiment.
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circles in the left panel of Figure , where the problem number is listed on the horizontal axis. The 
dash line with crosses represents the predicted behavior for a risk-neutral subject. As expected, 
all subjects were expected to choose Option A in the very first question. The proportion of Option 
A choices decreases in the problem number. That the solid line is above the dashed line for the 
questions -0 indicates the presence of risk-loving subjects. About 8% of the subjects never 
switched to Option B. The right panel of Figure  displays the proportions of Option A choices 
by gender. It shows that female subjects switched to Option B, i.e., safe choice, earlier than male 
subjects, which hints that male subjects are more risk-seeking than female subjects.
The problem numbers in which subjects switched from Option A to Option B can be used to 
estimate their risk aversion levels. Hereafter, assume that subjects were maximizing the expected 
value of the following CRRA utility function:




    ( r≠1 ) ,    
where x is the amount of money, and r is a relative risk aversion parameter. For each question, the 
value of this parameter can be determined by making the subject indifferent between Option A and 
Option B.
To estimate the distribution of r, an interval regression model is employed. To allow for 
heterogeneity regarding risk attitude, subject i’s relative risk aversion ri is modeled as a linear 
function of three individual characteristic variables. The dummy variable malei  takes on the value  
 For example, r = 0.0 for the third question and r = 0.5 for the fourth question. If the subject switched 
to Option B in the fourth question, her risk aversion parameter lies between 0.5 and 0.0. A subject is 
risk-averse if r > 0, risk-neutral if r = 0, and risk-seeking if r < 0.
 According to Harrison and Ruström (008), an interval regression model was first proposed by Coller 
and Williams (999) for a multiple price list (MPL) experimental task. The estimation technique in this 
subsection follows Chapter  of Moffatt (05).


































Figure : Proportion of Option A choices for each of the ten paired lottery choice problems
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if subject i is male and 0 otherwise. The other dummy variable econi takes on the value  if subject 
i majors in Economics and 0 otherwise. The variable yeari is the number of years subject i attended 













β ,σ2) .   
Suppose that subject i’s risk aversion parameter lies between a lower bound li and an upper bound 
ui. Given  ri ∼ N( xi β, σ ), this event happens with probability
L
i





σ ) ,   
where Φ( ⋅ ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Thus, the 
log-likelihood function can be written in the form of  ∑ i lnLi .
Table  reports the maximum likelihood estimates of β and σ. The variable male is significant, 
and its coef ficient is negative. Neither econ nor year is significant at conventional levels of 
significance. These results confirm past experimental evidence that male subjects are significantly 
more risk-seeking than female subjects.
 R package bbmle includes mle() function which was used to implement the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the interval regression model.
 For example, see Charness and Gneezy (0).
Coefficient 95%  Confidence Interval
(Intercept)   0.8 [-- 0.80 0.]
male -- 0.9** [-- 0.89 -- 0.]
econ   0.8 [-- 0. 0.5]
year -- 0.0 [-- 0.9 0.0]
σ   0.*** [0.50 0.8]
Log-likelihood: --.
Number of observations: 
   *: p < 0.05,  **:  p < 0.0,  ***: p < 0.00 
Table : Maximum likelihood estimates of β and σ
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4.2 All-Pay Auction (Stage 2)
Table  presents the observed frequency distributions of bids separately in terms of role 
origin and role.5 The mean bids differed for the Player A role (. yen for the random treatment 
versus 0 yen for the earned treatment), whereas the mean bids were the same for the Player B 
role (.8 yen for both treatments). To test the effect of role origin, the two observed frequency 
distributions of bids were compared separately for each player role. A permutation test of the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference for each 
player role at any conventional level of significance. The data provided no evidence of the effect of 
role origin on bidding behavior.
A fur ther inspection of the table reveals two other findings that defy the theoretical 
implications. First, the bid distributions are not uniform and rather right-skewed except the Player 
A’s bid distribution in the random treatment. Consequently, their mean bids are clearly lower than 
the predicted mean bid of 00 yen. To formally compare the predicted and observed distributions, 
a one-sample discrete Cramér-von Mises goodness-of-fit test was invoked. The rightmost column 
of Table  reports the results in terms of p-values. Only for the bid distribution of Player A subjects 
in the Random treatment did the test fail to reject the null hypothesis that the bids came from 
the discrete uniform distribution. Second, Player A subjects on average bid higher than Player B 
subjects. This finding seems to confirm a mild discouragement effect. However, neither of these 
differences was statistically significant; a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference in mean bid for each pairwise comparison.8
The analysis of Stage  confirmed the existence of gender difference in risk attitudes; male 
5 In Stage  there were three subjects who switched back and forth between the two options as they moved 
down the problems in Table . Although these subjects stayed in the session until the end, their data 
were removed since their behavior is considered inconsistent. The updated dataset includes 5 males 
and  females.
 The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic was used to implement a permutation test of equal bid 
distributions. The observed test statistics were 0.559 for the Player A role and 0. for the Player B 
role. The test was done for the Player A role as follows. A sample of n =  bids for the random treatment 
and a sample of m = 0 bids for the earned treatment were pooled into one sample. Then, chose  bids 
out of the pooled sample at random to the random treatment without replacement. The remaining 0 
bids were assigned to the earned treatment. The test statistic was computed based on this permutation 
resample. This permutation resampling was repeated 0000 times to form the permutation distribution 
of the statistic, i.e., the resampling distribution of the statistic under the null hypothesis. The p-value was 
estimated by locating the observed statistic on this distribution. A similar procedure was taken for the 
Player B role. The estimated p-values were 0.5 for Player A and 0.0 for Player B.
 R package dgof includes the Cramér-von Mises goodness-of-fit test. For more information, see Arnold 
and Emerson (0).
8 R package exactRankTests was used to perform the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The p-values were 0. 
for the random treatment and 0.5 for the earned treatment, respectively.
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subjects were significantly more risk loving than female subjects. This finding suggests the 
following two additional hypotheses. First, for the role of Player A, male subjects on average bid 
lower than female subjects. Second, for the role of Player B, male subjects on average bid higher 
than female subjects.
Table  reports the frequency distributions of bids separately in terms of gender and role. 
Holding role constant, the table shows different bidding patterns between males and females. For 
the Player A role, male subjects bid lower than female subjects; the mean bid of male subjects is 
08. yen whereas that of female subjects is .9 yen. The latter is significantly higher than the 
former at a 5% significance level, based on a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value = 0.059). 
For the Player B role, male subjects on average bid slightly higher than female subjects (9.9 
yen versus 5 yen). A one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference at any conventional significance level ( p-value = 0.).
5. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the experimental literature of all-pay auctions (Dechenaux et al., 0) 
by shedding some light on whether differences in role origin influence bidding behavior in the all-
pay auction in which two bidder roles were treated asymmetrically in case of a tie. The experiment 
manipulated how these two roles were allocated to subjects. No evidence was found to reject the 
hypothesis of no difference in bidding behavior between when the right to acquire the strong bidder 
role is earned and when it is windfall. Instead, the results show that females bid in a more risk-




0 00 00 00 800
Random
Player A 5 5    . 00      0.5
Player B 8 5   0 .8 00 < 0.00
Earned
Player A      0 0      0.00
Player B   0 0  .8 0 < 0.00




0 00 00 00 800
Player A
Male  5    08. 0
Female     5 .9 500
Player B
Male  8    9.9 00
Female   0 0  5 0
Table : Bid distribution by gender and role
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There are two possible reasons why the manipulation of role origin failed to induce significant 
variations in bidding behavior. First, dif ferences in the two role allocation procedures may be 
neither large nor clear enough to give birth to different behavioral rules indicating how each role 
should bid. Second, differences between the two bidder roles may be too small to recognize due to 
the set of parameter values used in the experiment; in equilibrium, both bidders should bid in the 
same manner, and the unfair tie breaking rule comes into play with probability 0.. Revising these 
aspects of the design is left for future research.
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